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tween games played for small stakes by Columbia students and the 
competition among nations for influence and power. 
In sum: in reading these reports of often very elegantly 
designed social science research on some of the most fundamental 
political issues, one cannot help but wish that the authors would 
extend the care they take designing their questionnaires and experi- 
ments to the logical interpretation of the results. It is only through 
such interpretation that the studies become available to and usable 
by nonexpert readers. Unfortunately, social scientists seem to con- 
cern themselves primarily with rigorous methods of collecting data, 
not so much with methodical argumentation on the basis of that 
data. 
VIGILANTE: THE BACKLASH AGAINST CRIME IN 
AMERICA. By William Tucker.1 New York: Stein and Day. 
1985. Pp. 371. $14.95. 
Steven H. Goldberg2 
Vigilante excuses subway gunman, Bernhard Goetz, as an in- 
evitable product of a permissive society in which punishment may 
be delayed or avoided by process. Mr. Tucker sees the subway en- 
counter between Goetz and three black youths as a microcosm of 
all that is wrong with America. The country has gone to hell in a 
hand basket, it happened during the 1960 '~~  and "intellectuals," 
lawyers, and judges did the carrying. The decade of degeneration, 
driven by intellectual drivel and represented quintessentially by the 
Warren Court, spawned an unprecedented crime wave that, in turn, 
provoked "good people" to replace their faith in the criminal justice 
system with blazing six-guns. 
These arguments deserve serious consideration, but this book 
contributes nothing to the debate. The author's anger with those he 
views as the handmaidens of the 1960's warps not only his perspec- 
tive, but his interest in research and analysis. Conclusions and an- 
ger are all there is to this book. yiglante is divided into three 
sections. The first, "What Went Wrong,'' focuses on what is wrong 
with the legal system: the exclusionary rule, lawyers, and judges. 
The middle, "How the System Should Work," deplores most sociol- 
ogy, psychology, and criminology. The last forty-six pages contain 
1. Author of PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRON- 
MENTALISM and contributor to various periodicals. 
2. Associate Dean, University of Minnesota Law School. 
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Tucker's solution to "The Root Causes of Crime": get the black 
community to get its act together. He presents his case with a fine 
writing style, a series of poignant anecdotes, a large measure of am- 
ateur sociology cum psychology, and an impressionistic world view 
uninhibited by evidence. His conclusions run against the fashion in 
most quarters; and his simplistic, often demeaning, presentation will 
do nothing to gain the attention of those with whom he disagrees. 
Tucker's brief for Bernhard Goetz as the symbol of American 
vigilantism has five major points: 
1. All criminals are morally deficient. 
2. The only way to deal with morally deficient people is to punish 
them. 
3. If the justice system will not punish criminals, "good people" 
will. 
4. The Warren Court's invention of the exclusionary rule created 
a crime wave and a vigilante reaction, because calculating 
criminals and good people both knew that criminals would 
never be punished. 
5. At the same time as the Warren Court was undermining the 
criminal justice system, black mothers were dominating their 
male children, thereby creating a society overflowing with 
"criminal personalities." 
Tucker's argument for the proposition that the Warren Court 
and black mothers, as joint venturers, produced the crime wave is 
typical of the entire book. The following passage gives the flavor of 
the argument: 
In a remarkable case of historical amnesia, justice officials awoke at one point in the 
1960's and said, "Who are all these unfortunate criminal defendants society keeps 
bringing before us? Can't anything be done besides punishing them? How can we 
expect these unfortunate individuals to defend themselves against the overwhelming 
powers of the state?" 
Thus, in a series of crucial reforms over the past twenty-five years, the criminal 
justice system has been completely transformed. . . . All this has been instituted to 
give an accused criminal a "sporting chance" to defend himself against the "over- 
whelming powers of the state." 
There is much to be said for the suggestion that the Warren 
Court's attempt to validate the guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
through the criminal justice system was a mistake that damaged the 
image of the incarceration system more than it increased govern- 
mental respect for the rights of citizens. Many have said it persua- 
sively, and many compelling arguments have been made in criticism 
of the Warren Court's criminal law revolution.3 The reader will 
3. The most recent example captures both the feel and the history of the criticism. 
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find none of these in Vigilante. Serious questions about the role of 
the Court, the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, and the effectiveness 
of the system are lost in the author's need to label the Warren Court 
and the legal profession as soft headed criminal-lovers with a cheer- 
leader's interest in criminal defendants, an antipathy for the citi- 
zen's legitimate interest in safety, and a nefarious motive for 
enforcing the Bill of Rights through the criminal justice system. 
Tucker's legal, factual, and analytic miscues would probably 
not be remarkable were he not so adamant about the rectitude of his 
own constitutional analysis, so deliberate in his desire to hang the 
crumbling of society around the neck of the Warren Court, and so 
persistent in pandering to the public's worst perception about the 
criminal justice system. I 
Despite its centrality to his argument, discussion of constitu- 
tional law makes up only a small part of the text. Tucker's main 
constitutional argument is that the Bill of Rights is not anti- 
majoritarian. The Court, he contends, has no business interpreting 
those provisions as preserving individual values against challenge by 
the state as representative of the majority. As a general technique 
for arguing that the constitutional decisions of the last quarter cen- 
tury are wrong, he invents Constitutional "rights" for victims, wit- 
nesses, and the government as surrogate for the majority. 
The right to be relatively safe and secure in your home and on the street is just as 
much a 'civil liberty' as the right to a grand jury indictment or a fair trial. 
Mrs. Coolidge's "Constitutional right" to cooperate with the police counted for 
nothing, of course, when compared to her husband's Constitutional right to try to 
get away with murder. 
Distortions like the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, which bestows rights only 
on guilty people, are clear violations of the "equal protection" clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. 
The right to "trial by jury" can be read as a right of the accused, but it can also be 
read as the right of a jury. 
All this [appellate consideration of constitutional issues] is in flagrant violation of 
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, which says: 
. . . no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
The Ninth Amendment speaks to the rights of crime victims. It doesn't say so in so 
many words, but the intent is clear. 
There is precious little analysis accompanying any of the above. 
Given the quality of Tucker's history and analysis when he makes 
the attempt, this is probably just as well. 
His search and seizure discussion is his longest and "best" at- 
---- - - - - - - 
Frase, Criminal Procedure in a Conservative Age: A Time to Rediscover the Criminal Noncon- 
stitutional Issues, 36 J .  LEGAL EDUC. 79 (1986). 
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tempt. The factual mistakes, though trivial, suggest a sloppiness 
that may explain the lack of serious consideration for the issues. He 
ought to know that it was not Mapp v. Ohio,4 but Wolfv. Colorado5 
that held the Fourth Amendment enforceable against the states. He 
ought to know that whatever lead the Warren Court to the decision 
in Mapp, it was not "watching the federal exclusionary rule circum- 
vented through the silver platter syndrome"-Elkins v. United 
States,G having put that issue to rest the previous year. The heart of 
his search and seizure "analysis" involves "fundamental fairness' 
and "mere evidence." He exhibits just enough knowledge of each to 
be dangerous. 
He asserts that the pre-Mapp standard for the constitutionality 
of searches and seizures was "fundamental fairness." His under- 
standing of that concept and its place in constitutional law is appar- 
ent in his definition: "The fundamental fairness doctrine was a rule 
of thumb, similar to Justice John Paul Stevens's famous definition 
of pornography: 'I may not be able to define it, but I know it when 
I see it.' " (Everybody knows that he really said: "I have not yet 
begun to fight.") The key ingredient implicit in the standard, ac- 
cording to Tucker, is "the public has an interest in a fair trial." 
Whether he understands but decides not to discuss the incorpora- 
tion issues, or believes that all of the pre-Mapp federal search and 
seizures cases were actually decided under a "fundamental fairness" 
standard is not clear. His subsequent discussion of Rochin v. Cali- 
fornia' and its "shocks the conscience" test for state cases, in the 
same paragraph with the Holmes observation that the federal gov- 
ernment "played an ignoble part" in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States8 suggests the latter. Referring specifically to the 
"fundamental fairness' approach to illegally seized evidence, Tucker 
observes: "All this changed with the introduction of the exclusion- 
ary rule. The guilt or innocence of the defendant is now no longer 
the overriding consideration." That the exclusionary rule predated 
both Silverthorne and Rochin, neither of which, in any event, turned 
on the guilt or the innocence of the defendants, apparently escaped 
the author. 
He considers the "mere evidence" rule to be court's most bi- 
zarre interpretation of the fourth amendment. In his haste to pil- 
lory the Warren Court, he fails to tell the reader that it was the 
Warren Court that abolished the rule. From his incorrect observa- 
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
6. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
7. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
8. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
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tion that the "Warren majority never assembled itself for another 
major decision" after the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizonap it is 
fair to conclude that his failure to mention the 1967 decision in 
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Haydenylo is a matter of igno- 
rance rather than an intent to deceive. He uses the "mere evidence" 
rule in conjunction with the exclusionary rule to lament the Warren 
Court's sympathy for the difliculty of police investigation: "Crimi- 
nal investigation is now a guessing game in which the police get one 
guess." He continues with this statement: "In order to conform 
with the courts' bizarre interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, 
the police have to be either prescient or psychic (p. 104). If the 
observation is correct, it is not because of the "mere evidence" rule 
and the Warren Court majority that put the forty-six-year old pre- 
cedent of Gouled v. United States11 to rest. 
The black mothers' part in Tucker's American immorality play 
is as poorly conceived and argued as is the part of the Warren 
Court. If anything, the psuedo-social science is less satisfactory 
than the constitutional analysis. It is, however, exemplary of the 
author's "answer first, questions later" approach to analysis, be it 
constitutional law or sociology. Tucker's "answer" is that the "real 
criminals" are black: "We might as well face it. When we talk 
about crime in America, we are talking largely about black crime" 
(p. 302). Asserting that it is only violent crime that is relevant, he 
sweeps aside white collar crime-and a lot of white criminals. In 
pursuing this uniquely colored definition of "crime" and "real 
criminals," the author ignores revenge murder and occasional drug 
use-the former because the author liked the reason for the killing 
and the latter because the author liked the criminal. 
The cause of the crime wave is as important to the author's 
previously conceived view of the world as is the color. Rejecting 
poverty ("it doesn't make sense to say that 'poverty causes crime,' 
Crime causes poverty.") and drugs (" 'drugs cause crime7-is proba- 
bly an inversion. . . . 'criminals often do drugs' "), Tucker places 
the blame on black women: 
As the perverse incentives of AFDC have taken hold of black culture, the average 
black family has turned into a woman, her assorted children, and a welfare check. 
. . . . Unfortunately, it seems very clear that a great deal of what we call the 
"criminal personality" is the result of men being raised exclusively, or under the 
predominating influence, of women. 
When ideology requires a different answer, Tucker employs a 
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
11. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
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different analysis. In his discussion of the death penalty, being un- 
able to demonstrate deterrence statistically, Tucker turns to the "re- 
cent emergence of the 'serial murderer."' "These are the 
murderers," he explains, "who were previousIy deterred by the 
death penalty." In this context, he prefers to have the blame fall 
elsewhere, and so delivers a blistering attack on those who assert 
family background plays a role in causing serial murders: "Once 
again the experts have tried to psychologize and sociologize the 
whole thing into oblivion. Searching for an explanation of the 'se- 
rial murderers,' The New York Times quoted one expert as saying: 
'All of them had real diiEculties with their mothers early on.' " 
When writing about black mothers, he must have forgotten his 
rapier-like response to the "experts" at The New York Times: 
Has there ever been a time when a certain portion of the population didn't have 
difficulties with their mothers early on? And even if motherhood were the problem, 
how is it that this whole new breed of killers, ranging in age from their early twen- 
ties to their late fifties, should suddenly start expressing their hostilities right about 
1972? 
The causes of crime and the role of the criminal justice system 
in our society are both overripe for review. The appropriate 
method for vindication of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights is still 
in doubt. The probable gulf between the public perception and the 
reality of the criminal justice system needs consideration and atten- 
tion. Vigilante, unfortunately offers nothing of value for any of the 
above. 
JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HIS- 
TORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME 
COURT. Henry Abraham.1 New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2d ed. 1985. Pp. xi, 430. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95. 
Kermit L. Hall2 
"In every case," writes Gerald Nachman of the San Francisco 
Examiner & Chronicle, "Judge Wapner rules quickly, firmly, and 
fairly. Nothing escapes his flinty gaze. I can't imagine how he's 
been overlooked for appointment to the Supreme Court, for clearly 
here is a man you would trust to rule wisely on abortion and class- 
room prayer."3 Familiar, benign, sensible, Joseph A. Wapner, the 
1. James Hart Professor of Government, University of Virginia. 
2. Professor of History and Law, University of Florida. 
3. San Francisco Exam. & Chron., June 16, 1985, Sunday Datebook, at 17. 
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